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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the agency of multinational corporations that 
perform social innovation under conditions of institutional complexity 
and resource constraints. Insights are drawn from a case study 
of Vodafone Group Plc and Safaricom Kenya Ltd that engaged in 
mobile money innovation in Kenya. The paper identifies three types 
of institutional voids that entrepreneurs can exploit to implement a 
social innovation: market, policy and social voids. Legitimating the 
social innovation involves appealing to the instrumental needs of 
target users, early and sustained engagement with policy-makers 
and redefining meanings of both incumbent and new technologies. 
The paper argues that spanning institutional voids – which provide 
entrepreneurial opportunities – also provide contingent legitimation 
narratives that can be targeted at different audiences. By mobilising 
insights from institutional theory, this paper provides a fresh 
perspective of social innovation in a base of the pyramid context.
1. Introduction
Despite massive investment to combat global poverty through government expenditure, 
foreign aid and private philanthropy, large segments of populations in developing coun-
tries continue to subsist on less than $2 a day. Academic interest in alternatives that use 
the market-based solutions to engage ‘base of the pyramid’ markets has increased in the 
recent past (Alvord, Brown, and Letts 2004; Dacin, Dacin, and Matear 2010; Mair and 
Martí 2006). Actors driven by this social mission may engage in social innovation which, 
according to Hämäläinen (2007), induces changes in a society’s cultural, normative or regu-
lative structures. Thus, such actors may be considered as institutional entrepreneurs as they 
mobilise resources to create divergent change to address social problems (Battilana, Leca, 
and Boxenbaum 2009). Within the institutional entrepreneurship literature, relatively low 
attention has been dedicated to understand efforts to provide solutions to social problems in 
‘institutionally complex’ (Greif 2006; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012) base of the pyramid 
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2   E. ONSONGO
(BOP) contexts where dynamics differ from industrialised contexts (Bruton 2010; Khoury 
and Prasad 2016; Margolis and Walsh 2003).
In the literature on entrepreneurship in emerging markets and BOP contexts, scholars 
have argued that institutional complexities and uncertainties create barriers for entrepre-
neurship (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha 2005; London and Hart 2004; Meyer et al. 2009). 
However, there’s an emerging stream of literature that shows that such complexities instead 
provide opportunities for entrepreneurship, while acknowledging that the exploitation of 
such opportunities is a demanding task that calls for social, political and cultural skills 
(Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum 2009; Khoury and Prasad 2016; Marti and Mair 2009; 
McKague, Zietsma, and Oliver 2015; Tracey and Phillips 2011). This paper contributes to 
the latter research stream, but rather than focusing on change processes led by NGOs and 
community-based organisations common in this literature, it focuses on change processes 
led by a multinational corporation (MNC).
Specifically, the study explores the managerial agency a MNC together with its local 
affiliate engaging in social innovation in a BOP context, concentrating on two phases 
of social innovation process as defined by Mulgan (2006): (1) when generating ideas by 
understanding needs and identifying potential solutions, and (2) when assessing, scaling 
up and diffusing good ideas. Insights are derived from the activities of Vodafone Group 
Plc and its affiliate Safaricom Kenya Ltd during the development and launch of M-Pesa, a 
mobile phone-based money transfer innovation. M-Pesa was launched in Kenya 2007 as an 
alternative to established commercial banking services with the view of providing formal 
financial services to ‘the unbanked’ population. Compared to similar innovations globally, 
deeper levels of financial inclusion in Kenya have been achieved through M-Pesa adoption. 
Analysis of this case provides a toolkit of strategies and actions that could be deployed by 
MNCs to promote institutional change in a BOP context, while mitigating the liability of 
newness associated with the introduction of innovative products.
With regard to the first phase where entrepreneurs focus on seeking opportunities by 
understanding needs and seeking solutions, the paper mobilises the notion of ‘institu-
tional voids’ (Khanna and Palepu 2000) which according to Mair and Marti (2009) creates 
opportunity spaces for entrepreneurs to exercise managerial agency. Based on the two 
interpretations of institutional voids in previous literature, i.e. (1) the absence or weak-
ness of formal market institutions (Khanna and Palepu 2000), and (2) gaps or spaces that 
occur at the interfaces between informal institutional spheres (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 
2012), the study identifies a market void and a social void that were exploited by Vodafone 
and Safaricom to launch M-Pesa in the Kenyan financial services sector. However, a third 
void was identified, one that did not fit with the definitions in previous literature because 
it occurred at the interface of two formal institutional spheres, i.e. a policy void between 
banking and telecommunications. Accordingly, the paper proposes the theoretical exten-
sion of the institutional voids construct, while illustrating how spanning voids afford both 
opportunity discovery and opportunity creation.
For the implementation phase of social innovation where good ideas are scaled up and 
diffused, the paper draws insights from the literature on institutional work (Lawrence and 
Suddaby 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2011) and legitimacy (Suchman 1995) to 
explore the legitimacy-building strategies. The case shows that entrepreneurs employ dif-
ferent targeted strategies to convince different constituencies of the fitness of their new 
business model, organisational form or technology to existing norms, values, beliefs and 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
6.9
0.1
1.1
59
] a
t 0
0:1
5 1
1 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION  3
definitions. The strategies used to build legitimacy for the social innovation are derived 
from the considerations made during the innovation process to simultaneously exploit 
multiple institutional voids. In this regard, the case study illustrates how key actors con-
ferred legitimacy when the entrepreneurs demonstrated that the innovation was effective 
in actually filling the void.
This paper makes several contributions to literature. First, it develops a much-needed 
account of the activities that institutional entrepreneurs as they attempt to institutional-
ise a social innovation in a BOP context. By mobilising perspectives from institutional 
theory, it adds fresh insights to the social innovation literature by proposing a toolkit of 
strategy choices that can successfully deploy a social innovation. The paper also intro-
duces a new understanding of institutional voids that increases the scope for analysing 
entrepreneurial opportunities, and explains how by exploiting the voids, innovations 
gain legitimacy. More broadly, the study contributes a new understanding to the study 
of poverty alleviation through market-based solutions deployed in an understudied 
geographical context.
2. Literature review
2.1. Social innovation
Although many conceptions of ‘social innovation’ exist in the literature, a common thread 
among the definitions offered is its intentionality, and this distinguishes it from social change 
(Franz, Hochgerner, and Howaldt 2012). The point of departure is in the focus on whether 
an innovation is social in its means, or social in its end. In the former, scholars emphasise 
a goal-oriented view, i.e. the potential of an innovation to meet social needs, (e.g. Mulgan 
2006; Phills, Deiglmeier, and Miller 2008). In the latter, they emphasise a process-oriented 
view, i.e. the social processes that deliver products and services (e.g. Mumford 2002). A com-
bined view – ‘social both in their ends and their means’ (Murray, Caulier-Grice, and Mulgan 
2010, 346) – has been put forward, and is now widely adopted in policy decision-making. 
However, this definition is considered scientifically imprecise as it does not account for social 
innovations that were not intended as social at the point of invention, or social innovations 
that were not delivered through social means (Franz, Hochgerner, and Howaldt 2012). Thus, 
a conceptualisation of social innovation that highlights a change in or new interpretations 
of institutional elements such as roles, relations, expectations, practices, norms and val-
ues is more desirable (Franz, Hochgerner, and Howaldt 2012; Hämäläinen 2007). As this 
paper adopts a neo-institutional lens, it favours the following definition offered by Franz, 
Hochgerner, and Howaldt (2012, 6): ‘social innovation consists of new, more effective and/or 
more efficient social practices with social ends and social means’. Following this definition, 
actors engaging in social innovation may be perceived as institutional entrepreneurs who, 
according to DiMaggio (1988), mobilise resources to create new institutions or transform 
existing ones in order to realise interests they value highly. By example, The Grameen Bank 
has been presented as a successful social innovation (Mulgan 2006; Murray, Caulier-Grice, 
and Mulgan 2010) that established microfinance as a new method of fighting poverty by 
availing credit to impoverished people, whereby its founder, Muhammad Yunus, may be 
considered an institutional entrepreneur.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
6.9
0.1
1.1
59
] a
t 0
0:1
5 1
1 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
4   E. ONSONGO
2.2. Institutional voids
When evaluating the success of institutional entrepreneurs in orchestrating change, in this 
case through social innovation, it is important to consider the characteristics of the envi-
ronment in which they are embedded and their social position in that field (Battilana, Leca, 
and Boxenbaum 2009), which in this case is the base of the pyramid (BOP). BOP contexts 
have been defined based on per capita income at or below US$1500 or US$2000 per annum 
(Prahalad and Hammond 2002). Other definitions make references to ‘the bottom billion’ 
or even ‘the bottom four billion’ of the global population who reportedly live on or below 
the income thresholds of US$1 or US$2 per day (Bruton 2010; Hart and Christensen 2002). 
Geographically speaking, BOP contexts have been equated with entire countries and regions 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Khoury and Prasad 2016; Kolk, Rivera-Santos, and Rufín 
2014), or even more generally, emerging markets (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha 2005; London 
and Hart 2004). While the literature shows divergences in the delineation of the BOP and 
has received criticism for this (Karnani 2007), a defining characteristic of these contexts is 
economic poverty or severe resource constraints.
Along with resource constraints, BOP contexts have been regarded as ‘institutionally 
complex’ (Greif 2006; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012), as such environments consist inter-
locks of formal institutions such as constitutions, laws, property rights and governmental 
regulations, and informal institutions such as customs, traditions and religious beliefs. 
‘Modern’ (Western-style) or formal market institutions are typically either absent, weak or 
exclusive. In the literature, these contexts are deemed to have ‘institutional voids’, a notion 
that has been interpreted in two ways: (1) the absence, weakness or failure of formal insti-
tutions to support a market economy. Khanna and Palepu (2006, 62) who originated this 
view describe institutional voids as ‘the absence of specialist intermediaries, regulatory sys-
tems, and contract enforcing mechanisms’. In other words, institutionally void contexts are 
characterised by a variety of market failures that become apparent in the absence of efficient 
intermediation, and thus, an increase in transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu 2000). (2) 
Gaps occurring at the interfaces between indigenous or informal institutional spheres such 
as community, politics and religion and formal market institutions. This perspective argues 
that institutional voids are associated with contradictions brought about when a plethora of 
formal and informal institutions driven by multiple logics serve the same organisational field 
(Greif 2006; Mair and Marti 2009; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012), resulting in conflicts 
and uncertainty about which institutions apply in different scenarios, or exclusion of actors 
for whom the logics do not apply. For example, property rights as formal market institution 
may conflict with patriarchal systems in many BOP settings that disfavour women’s access 
and ownership of assets. From these two interpretations of institutional voids, we can infer 
that voids have only been associated with spheres where weak formal institutions persist, 
and in spheres populated by informal institutions. Consequently, voids are unlikely to occur 
in the presence of strong formal institutions. This paper interrogates this proposition.
It is worth noting that similar institutional complexities have been found in transition 
economies (Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010; Santangelo and Meyer 2011). These econ-
omies are also characterised by weak regulatory institutions, and normative and cognitive 
institutions that are not necessarily congruent with market institutions (Ahlstrom and 
Bruton 2010; Williams and Vorley 2015). Rather than relying on formal market institutions, 
entrepreneurs rely on trust in networks and informal institutions such as blat in Russia 
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INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION  5
and guanxi in China (Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010). The difference is that as these 
economies are rapidly industrialising, they experience dramatic and unpredictable shifts 
in institutional structures as they reform and adjust to economic changes, thus potentially 
exacerbating the occurrence of institutional voids.
While Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2000) view institutional voids as impediments to 
entrepreneurship, Mair and Marti (2009, 420) consider them ‘opportunity spaces for insti-
tutional entrepreneurship’. Tracey and Phillips (2011, 32) further propose that ‘the greater 
the number of institutional voids in an emerging market, the greater the opportunities for 
entrepreneurs to found ventures that span them’. Despite the availability of such oppor-
tunities, exploiting them – an effort that may involve innovating in and around voids, 
or spanning multiple institutional voids – would be a demanding form of institutional 
entrepreneurship (Tracey and Phillips 2011) complicated by the lack of widely accepted 
institutional arrangements, whether formal and informal. For entrepreneurs engaging in 
social innovation in and around institutional voids, it is expected that this complexity would 
be carried forward to the task of building legitimacy for the innovation. This brings us to 
the question of whether, given their social mission, social innovations face the challenge 
of gaining legitimacy in the targeted environment.
2.3. Legitimacy building challenges for social innovations
It has been taken for granted that social missions have an inherent measure of legitimacy 
(Alvord, Brown, and Letts 2004; Dacin, Dacin, and Matear 2010; Mair and Martí 2006). 
However, as already seen, social innovation involves actions intended to disrupt or trans-
form prevailing institutions that have stabilised around social problems. It is also likely that 
social innovations introduced into a context suffer from the ‘liability of newness’ (Freeman, 
Carroll, and Hannan 1983), and as a consequence, entrepreneurs must engage in legitima-
tion activities to convince key actors about the fitness of the new organisational form existing 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Aldrich and Marlene Fiol 1994; Suchman 1995). The 
challenge of pursuing legitimacy for social innovation in and around institutional voids 
is exacerbated by the lack of relevant actors, and therefore the difficulty in identifying key 
actors with whom the entrepreneurs can build networks and form alliances with. As already 
seen, institutional gaps imply that commonly accepted business practices, organisational 
structures, dominant designs, industry standards and other types of institutions are few or 
lacking (Tracey and Phillips 2011) or that informal or indigenous have conflicting logics 
(Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012). As a consequence, shared meaning systems that would 
form the basis of a legitimation effort for an innovation are lacking.
To address this challenge, Tracey and Phillips (2011) suggest that entrepreneur could 
create proto-institutions, i.e. practices, technologies and rules as ‘institutions in the mak-
ing’ (Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips 2002, 283), then seek ways to institutionalise them. 
Alternatively, entrepreneurs may form a new organisational field to substitute for the institu-
tional voids through their efforts to legitimite their start-ups (de Lange 2016). This requires 
similar skills as those held by entrepreneurs entering emerging markets (Maguire, Hardy, 
and Lawrence 2004). For instance, entrepreneurs must be skilled in the ability to develop 
networks and alliances with diverse stakeholders associated with institutions next to or 
across the voids. Similarly, they must be able to theorise about the innovation in ways that 
appeal to those stakeholders, and align the innovation and its associated practices with 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
6.9
0.1
1.1
59
] a
t 0
0:1
5 1
1 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
6   E. ONSONGO
existing institutions across or around the void. These crossovers may result in resistance 
to participation, as if often evident with social innovations, due to fear of risks and loss of 
status quo positions, resistance to change and strong social ties (Mulgan et al. 2007).
The institutional work and legitimacy literature (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence, 
Suddaby, and Leca 2011; Suchman 1995) provides a framework for understanding entre-
preneurs’ efforts to ensure the diffusion and stabilisation of social innovation at the field 
level. Strategies may entail discursive, political, relational and regulative activities, with 
the aim of gaining pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Further, diverse typologies 
of strategies are deployed depending upon the context examined (Dacin, Oliver, and Roy 
2007; Suchman 1995).
In view of this literature, the paper seeks evidence from the case study that explains 
how institutional entrepreneurs spanning voids legitimate social innovations in a BOP 
environment.
3. Empirical context: M-Pesa as a social innovation
The case of the development of mobile money transfer services in Kenya offers an excellent 
opportunity to explore the efforts of entrepreneurs engaged in a mission to solve the social 
problem of financial exclusion. In 2005, Kenya had a population of 35 million, of which only 
19% held accounts in formal financial institutions. The rest of the population either relied 
on self-organised community-level informal financial services such as Rotating Savings 
and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), Welfare Clan Groups (WCGs) and informal money 
lenders or were completely excluded from any form of financial services (CBK, KNBS, 
and FSD Kenya 2007). This segment of the population was referred to as the unbanked. 
Commercial banks had little incentive to provide financial services to this market segment 
as the margins expected from micro-transactions conducted by the poor would not offset 
the costs of installing and operating banking infrastructure in low income and rural areas. 
The unbanked were considered financially excluded, which is a form of exclusion that lim-
its households’ ability to make savings that they can invest in economic activities to raise 
incomes, prevents them from shielding against income shocks through access to credit and 
insurance (Jack and Suri 2014) and limits options for diversifying income sources, e.g. from 
remittances (Malkamäki, Johnson, and Nino-Zarazua 2009).
Financial exclusion is a social problem for which social innovations such as microfinance 
have been devised (Dash 2012). This study considers M-Pesa as a social innovation based 
on the social mission to ‘reach the unbanked’ that framed the innovation process and out-
come, specifically in: (1) the sourcing of capital from a challenge fund, (2) the domicile of 
the initiative in the Corporate Social Responsibility programme of Vodafone Plc, (3) the 
collaboration of diverse actors from telecommunications, banking and microfinance in its 
formulation and early development, (4) user involvement in the development process and 
(5) the introduction of an almost instantaneous success in ‘deepening’ access to financial 
services (from 19 to 71%). These characteristics conform to both the process-oriented and 
goal-oriented elements of this study’s working definition of social innovation put forth by 
Franz, Hochgerner, and Howaldt (2012).
At the time of development, pilot and national launch, M-Pesa was the only technology 
of its kind locally and globally. Due to this, M-Pesa had a high liability of newness, and thus, 
it is expected that its innovators would be confronted by a steep challenge to legitimate it. 
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INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION  7
The case of M-Pesa therefore provides fertile ground for an analytical exploration of insti-
tutional entrepreneurship and related legitimacy building activities.
4. Data collection and analysis
Case study data were collected in three ways: retrieval of archival documents, interviews and 
participant observation. In the process of developing the initial analytical narrative, the study 
relied on information retrieved from pre-existing accounts of the development of M-Pesa 
documented by various players: the two main executives at Vodafone directly involved in 
the innovation process (Hughes and Lonie 2007); Consult Hyperion, an electronic payments 
consulting firm whose role was to ensure operational and security robustness of M-Pesa 
(Makin 2009); Financial Sector Deepening trust (FSD Kenya 2009, 2012) and Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion (AFI 2010), both being non-profit organisations active in financial 
inclusion initiatives in Kenya, and GSM Association, an organisation that represents the 
interest of mobile operators (Muthiora 2015). In addition, the author consulted Vodafone 
and Safaricom’s annual company reports, technical reports on M-Pesa, Central Bank of 
Kenya banking supervision reports, newsletters, circulars and press releases for the period 
between 2001 and 2012. Media reports on M-Pesa and mobile money in general were also 
gathered for the same period, and these included press clippings from the two major daily 
newspapers, video clips, television and newspaper advertisements and blog reports. Several 
research papers (e.g. Mas and Kumar 2008; Mas and Morawczynski 2009; Mas and Ng’weno 
2010) provided further insights.
To fill gaps in the developing analytical narrative written based on secondary data and 
clarify pending questions, seven live and pre-recorded interviews of executives and employ-
ees at Vodafone UK and Safaricom Kenya Ltd, Central Bank of Kenya and Financial Sector 
Deepening Trust were conducted and obtained. Pre-recorded interviews were obtained in 
cases where live interviews with informants were difficult to arrange (see Table 1 for the 
list of interviews). Semi-structured, open-ended questions were used to understand the 
internal processes of M-Pesa development, and the strategies employed to engage with 
different actors in the financial services sector. Purposive theoretical sampling strategy 
(Strauss 1987) was used to identify relevant sources of data both for the secondary data 
collection process and identification of informants for the interviews. Finally, the author 
drew insights from the observation of the launch of M-Pesa, adoption of technology and 
participation in numerous domestic remittances using M-Pesa. Visits with M-Pesa agents, 
and informal interactions with M-Pesa agents and customers in various parts of Nairobi 
Table 1. List of interviews.
Position Affiliation Interview no.
Principal Product Manager – M-Pesa vodafone Group services Interview 1
Former Head of Global Payments (pre-recorded) vodafone Group services Interview 2
Former senior product manager (pre-recorded) vodafone Group services Interview 3
Mobile Money (M-Pesa) Business analytics Consultant safaricom Ltd Interview 4
General Manager safaricom Financial services (pre-recorded) safaricom Ltd Interview 5
Former CEo (pre-recorded) safaricom Ltd Interview 6
director of Mobile Money Competing mobile operator Interview 7
Manager, Financial Inclusion Central Bank of Kenya Interview 8
research specialist Financial sector deepening Kenya Interview 9
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8   E. ONSONGO
city and Machakos town enriched the general understanding of the public discourses on 
mobile money transfer in Kenya.
Data analysis involved constructing a narrative account (Langley 1999) of M-Pesa 
development, launch and diffusion by fleshing out the chronology of events outlined in 
Table 2 based on the documentary evidence and interviews. The data were coded in two stages 
based on analytical categories derived from literature on institutional voids (Khanna and 
Palepu 2000; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012) and institutional work and legitimacy strat-
egies (Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum 2009; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Suchman 1995).
The initial open coding exercise conceptualised the action the data described. With regard 
to the first phase where ideas are generated and potential solutions are identified, the coding 
exercise paid attention to identifying instances in the formal and the informal institutional 
environments where institutional weaknesses and gaps as described by Khanna and Palepu 
(1997, 2000) and Mair, Marti, and Ventresca (2012) were evident. Examples of codes in this 
phase included ‘voids in the formal environment’, ‘voids in the informal environment’ and 
‘voids at the interface of the formal and informal’. The open coding exercise for the second 
phase of implementing the social innovation focused on identifying the strategic moves 
of Vodafone and Safaricom to influence their audience by building legitimacy, and codes 
such as ‘mimicry’, ‘educating’ and ‘theorising’ were used. However, it was found that that 
these strategies were being deployed in different ways for different audiences. Therefore, the 
strategies were grouped together depending upon the audience, resulting in codes such as 
‘legitimacy among clients’, ‘legitimacy among government and industry officials’.
Table 2. Chronology of events detailing vodafone and safaricom’s actions, changes in the market and 
regulatory environment over time. the table was compiled from various sources.
Year Event
2003 vodafone wins £1 million bid with Financial deepening Challenge Fund (FdCF), which it matched equally
2003 vodafone and safaricom Ltd partner with Faulu Kenya and Commercial Bank of africa to develop microfinance 
repayment tool dubbed M-Pesa
2003 M-Pesa technological platform is developed by sagentia uK
2005 safaricom approaches Central Bank of Kenya with request for authorisation for M-Pesa pilot project
2005 M-Pesa pilot begins in nairobi CBd, Mathare and thika
2006 CBK releases the Microfinance act 
2006 safaricom requests authorisation from Central bank to launch M-Pesa as a money transfer service (rather than 
as a microfinance repayment tool)
2007 CBK audits legal structure of M-Pesa. Legal opinion distinguished M-Pesa from commercial banks. CBK issues 
‘Letter of no objection’ to M-Pesa
2007 Formal national launch of M-Pesa
2007 M-Pesa subscription rates increase rapidly, signifying the acceptance of mobile phone-based P2P money 
transfer practices
2007 Cardless atM withdrawals introduced to M-Pesa users
2007 Bill payments and bulk salary payments introduced to M-Pesa
2007 Equity Bank, Family Bank and Cooperative Bank introduce financial products for the low-income segment
2008 Banks pressure Minister of Finance to shut down M-Pesa. the Minister of Finance requests an audit of M-Pesa 
2009 a ‘clean bill of health’ awarded to M-Pesa. Legal opinion distinguishes M-Pesa from banking
2009 Entry of yuCash mobile money service 
2009 International remittances from Western union via M-Pesa allowed
2009 Changes in Banking act to accommodate mobile money banking and agency banking
2009 Proceeds of Crime and anti Money Laundering act passed 
2011 Entry of airtel Money and tangaza Pesa mobile money services
2011 national Payments systems act the recognises mobile money passed by parliament
2012 CBK holds public consultation on Electronic Money regulations; regulation for the Provision of Electronic 
retail transfers; anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for the provision of Mobile Payment services
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INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION  9
Subsequently, emergent themes from the open codes were identified through an inductive 
process. For instance, an evaluation of the excerpts of data related to the first phase coded 
under each first order code revealed a coherent set of second-order themes that character-
ised the institutional gaps. For instance, the institutional gaps discovered within the formal 
environment related to efforts of the entrepreneurs to position M-Pesa within the existing 
regulatory framework, or efforts of the Communications Commission of Kenya to find a 
regulatory mandate over M-Pesa. The lack of relevant laws or guidelines suitable for M-Pesa 
oversight implied that there was a policy void. Thus, ‘policy void’ became an emergent 
theme that used in the next phase of coding, as was the ‘social void’ and ‘market void’. The 
same process was repeated for the excerpts on building legitimacy as illustrated in Figure 1.
The next section first presents the narrative account, followed by the findings of this 
analytical procedure.
5. M-Pesa development and deployment
Under its Corporate Social Responsibility programme’s mandate to ‘transform people’s 
lives and contribute to global sustainable development goals’, Vodafone established a social 
investment fund in 2006 to ‘provide incremental resources going forward and to seed initi-
atives that can demonstrate high social value’ (Vodafone, 2006, 15), and hired an executive 
to set up the corporate responsibility team and to ‘help [Vodafone] understand its role in 
addressing issues like the Millennium Development Goals’ (Hughes and Lonie 2007, 65), 
who then conceived the idea of tackling financial exclusion in developing countries as a 
potentially fruitful avenue. After submitting a grant proposal to the UK Government’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) Financial Deepening Challenge Fund in 
2003, Vodafone was awarded £1 million on a matched basis based on a pledge to contribute 
the equivalent in mostly human resource costs.
To identify local challenges in financial services, Vodafone and its Kenyan subsidiary 
Safaricom Ltd held a series of brainstorming workshops in Nairobi composed of banks, 
microfinance institutions, technology companies, telecom firms, non-governmental organ-
isations and industry regulators. Vodafone and Safaricom then formed a partnership with 
Faulu Kenya, a microfinance institution, and Commercial Bank of Africa, an East African 
Figure 1. overview of the analytical coding process.
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bank. From this partnership, a proposition emerged to develop a platform that would 
enable Faulu Kenya’s customers who were organised in informal groups, or chamas, to 
receive and repay microfinance loans. A mobile phone-based cash transfer platform dubbed 
M-Pesa1 was developed in conjunction with Sagentia, a UK-based software development 
firm. M-Pesa would run on a subscriber identification module (SIM) card used in the most 
basic and low-cost mobile phones based on the Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) protocol that enabled electronic cash transfers via short messaging service (SMS).
From October 2005, M-Pesa underwent an eight-month pilot test in three locations: 
Nairobi central business district, Mathari – one of the largest slums – and Thika – a town 
located at an hour’s drive north of Nairobi. A major part of the pilot involved recruiting 
small businesses to act as agents of M-Pesa, providing cash-in and cash-out services akin 
to commercial bank branches.2 Further product and business model improvements were 
made – many based on user adaptation of M-Pesa functions, and numerous customer and 
agent training sessions were conducted. During these activities, Vodafone contended with 
resource constrains associated with capital, technology, human resources, literacy levels of 
the target market and unreliable transportation systems across the country.
Despite the challenges navigating these constraints, M-Pesa was launched nationally 
in March 2007, flagged by the massive and culturally compelling ‘Send Money Home’ 
marketing campaign. M-Pesa was adopted immediately and rapidly: in July 2007, about 
268,000 people subscribed to M-Pesa. One year later, subscription increased by 2652% to 
about 7,388,000 (Kimenyi and Ndung’u 2009, 2). Within exactly three years, the number 
of registered customers had reached 10.3 million which corresponded to 21% of the entire 
Kenyan population or 46% of the adult population. The agent network had grown to 17,700 
outlets with nearly half located in rural areas, and the equivalent of US$371 million in 
person-to-person transfers was made through M-Pesa, which generated US$100 million 
in annual revenue. By March 2014, M-Pesa had 26.2 million registered users, or 71% of 
the adult population, the value of money transfers had risen to US$2.1 billion. M-Pesa 
and other latecomer mobile money platforms are touted as enabling financial inclusion 
in Kenya by decreasing the proportion of the population excluded from formal financial 
services (World Bank 2013).
6. Analysis: Vodafone and Safaricom as institutional entrepreneurs
The foregoing narrative account outlines the nature of the institutional environment into 
which Vodafone Group Plc entered with the aspiration to develop a technological solution 
to a social problem as part of its corporate social responsibility programme. Through its col-
laboration with its locally respected subsidiary, Safaricom Ltd, Vodafone engaged different 
skills and resources to tackle or exploit various challenges and opportunities, most notably, 
sourcing for capital for a high risk social project, developing familiarity with an exotic 
BOP institutional context and navigating its corresponding resource constraints, designing 
and deploying a feasible technology and business model and legitimising principles that 
1the ‘M’ refers to mobile, while ‘pesa’ is swahili for money, thus the popular term ‘mobile money’. this catchy product name 
was proposed by a local advertising agency.
2Initially, safaricom’s already established airtime dealers were selected to serve as agents, but as subscription to the M-Pesa 
service grew, the agent network diversified to include a myriad of small businesses or kiosks such as shops, grocers, phar-
macies and even small clothing boutiques.
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threatened pre-existing institutional arrangements. This section explores the strategies that 
Vodafone and Safaricom employed to influence prevailing institutions and introduce a 
divergent business model.
6.1. Exploiting institutional voids
6.1.1. The market void
As seen earlier, the vast majority of the Kenyan population living in low-income urban areas 
and rural villages did not have access to formal financial services by 2006. Commercial banks 
did not consider bottom-of-the-pyramid households as a target market. These households 
instead used informal non-market-based mechanisms of financial management, primar-
ily through informal groups, or chamas. The absence of formal financial services in these 
regions – a phenomenon that can be understood as an absence of formal market institutions, 
and therefore a market void – presented an opportunity for entrepreneurship.
The social innovation process in Vodafone and Safaricom therefore began with the iden-
tification of the underserved market for which the innovative activity would be targeted, and 
an effort to understand the specific needs of this market in order to build a feasible solution. 
As the Vodafone senior product manager reported: ‘We had to find customers with a real 
market need to use the service. This may appear obvious, but the mobile commerce market 
is strewn with technical solutions looking for a problem’ (Hughes and Lonie 2007, 70).
While only 19% of the population had access to a bank, the 2006 FinAccess Survey shows 
that 56% of the population had access to mobile phones. Mobile penetration in Kenya had 
been increasing rapidly since the late 1990s and early 2000s when the telecommunications 
industry was liberalised. Reforms in the sector facilitated the entry of Safaricom Ltd and 
other firms, and stiff competition among them resulted in lower prices and increased cov-
erage. The number of mobile subscribers grew from 15,000 in 1998 to 3.4 million in 2004, 
9.3 million in 2006 and 16 million in 2008, and Safaricom controlled 80% of this market. 
Consequently, for Vodafone, the existing telecommunications infrastructure which extended 
beyond the geographical reach of commercial banking could be leveraged to extend a formal 
financial service into areas dominated exclusively by informal market institutions.
The existence of the market void notwithstanding, the M-Pesa team needed a value 
proposition that resonated with Vodafone Group management on the one hand, and with 
Safaricom and the Kenyan market on the other. For the parent company, the M-Pesa plat-
form provided an entry point into the US$300 million international remittance market 
fuelled by migrants sending money home, and it begun piloting a mobile phone-based 
international transfer service with Citigroup (Vodafone 2007, 76). In order to appeal to the 
Kenyan market, the two firms exploited a social void arising from a change in the config-
uration of households and communities in Kenya, as seen below.
6.1.2. The social void
Demographic changes and rapid urbanisation since colonial times have affected tradi-
tional family and community structures in Kenya. With the development of cities and 
large towns as economic centres, there has been increasing migration from rural to urban 
areas. Migrants are typically younger, male and more literate members of these communi-
ties seeking better economic and educational opportunities in urban areas, leaving more 
dependent members of their households in rural areas. According to the World Bank’s World 
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Development Indicators, 20% of the Kenyan population lived in urban areas. By 2004, about 
a third of all Kenyan households divided their members between urban and rural homes 
(Agesa 2004). Due to this migration pattern, traditional family and communal structures 
for resource development and resource sharing began to disintegrate through losses in 
agricultural labour, changing gender dynamics3 and changing social network structures. 
As a result, social voids have been created.
To compensate for their absence and their inability to directly contribute towards tradi-
tional resource-generating family or community practices, urban migrants remit substantial 
proportions of their wages to their rural homes. However, there was a lack of efficient mech-
anisms for making money transfers, especially since the senders tended to be the banked 
in urban areas, while the recipients were unbanked and the excluded in rural villages. As 
Vodafone’s principal product manager for M-Pesa remarked:
Because of the rural-urban migration of people coming to cities to work, you will find many 
families in Kenya with husbands living in urban areas and their wives in rural areas, or children 
working in the cities having parents who depend on them in the rural areas. There are a lot of 
outflows of cash from the cities to rural areas. This was a massive opportunity for Safaricom 
and M-Pesa to use the person-to-person system of transfer. (Interview 1)
As indicated by respondents in the 2006 FinAccess Survey, in-kind delivery through fam-
ily and friends, deliveries using public bus and matatu4 couriers and post office money orders 
were considered unreliable, unsafe and costly and were prone to leakage. Similar concerns 
were expressed by members of chamas who dispersed to various parts of the country while 
seeking economic opportunities, and due to their inability to physically participate in group 
meetings they needed reliable mechanisms for transferring cash. Thus, the cultural practice 
of making domestic remittances in Kenya fuelled the demand for money transfer platforms.
The shifts within informal cultural institutions created social voids that were perceived as 
opportunities for innovation, such that Vodafone and Safaricom’s commercial team devel-
oped the M-Pesa launch proposition suggestive of this void, titled ‘Send Money Home’.
6.1.3. The policy void
Vodafone and Safaricom created, and then leveraged a policy void at the interface of commer-
cial banking and telecommunications, two well-established formal market sectors. Financial 
institutions were licensed and regulated by the Central Bank of Kenya, and therefore, the 
entry of a mobile operator in the finance space had been inconceivable until then. As the 
Vodafone head of social innovation reported when referring to the submission of the bid 
for funding from the Financial Deepening Challenge Fund (FDCF):
The entrant of a telecom company into a funding competition for the financial services sector 
took a few of the FDCF proposal review team by surprise, but we overcame some initial cyn-
icism and were awarded funding of nearly £1 million. (Hughes and Lonie 2007, 67)
3In many cases, the highly gendered pattern of rural–urban migration left women to manage households and agricultural 
production. In general, women were disempowered when securing their rights to land, labour and agricultural income 
(Francis 2002).
4Matatus are informal shared taxis that dominate the public transportation system in Kenya. the drivers of matatus often 
provide courier services for customers looking to send money or goods to their family and friends located in other parts 
of the country.
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As a mobile operator, Safaricom Ltd was licensed under the Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK)5 regulatory authority which governed information and com-
munications sectors including broadcasting, multimedia, telecommunications, electronic 
commerce, postal and courier services. Besides recognising M-Pesa as a value-added service 
to Safaricom’s repertoire of products, CCK had no regulatory apparatus that could oversee 
the development of M-Pesa as a financial service. As a consequence, CCK deferred to the 
financial services industry regulator, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), which had experi-
ence overseeing payment systems and commercial banking. Even so, the Banking Act had 
no provisions mandating CBK to regulate non-bank actors, and as such, CBK had no clear 
authority over non-bank funds transfer either (AFI 2010, 5). Even though the 2003 amend-
ment of the CBK Act gave the CBK power to ‘formulate and implement such policies as best 
promote the establishment, regulation and supervision of efficient and effective payment, 
clearing and settlement systems’ (CBK Act, Section 4A (d)), the operational modalities of 
such oversight had not been worked out pending the approval of the National Payments 
Systems bill6 (Mas and Ng’weno 2010). In a press release in 2009, Central Bank of Kenya 
even clarified that it ‘… does not regulate mobile phone providers …, as they are licensed by 
the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK)’. Effectively, the legal environment for 
regulating M-Pesa at the time of development and launch remained unclear, and therefore, 
technically, neither CCK nor CBK could interfere with M-Pesa development and launch.
As the policy-makers grappled with regulating M-Pesa, the entrepreneurs also internally 
wrestled with the identity of M-Pesa in the existing institutional configuration. Neither 
Safaricom nor Vodafone had a banking license, and therefore, managing the legal and 
regulatory structure of the business proved challenging. Resolving the dilemma involved 
‘many rounds of discussions with Kenyan and English lawyers, many straw men, and many 
heated debates’ (Hughes and Lonie 2007, 79) from which a complex legal structure to run 
the M-Pesa service in Kenya was developed.
The struggles on both the regulators’ part and the entrepreneurs’ part is evidence of 
a policy void, as prior to M-Pesa, there was yet to be an important policy problem at the 
interface of banking and telecommunications for which interventions would have been 
developed. Therefore, rather than being an exemplar of the failure of market institutions in 
this setting, the institutional void was due to the absence of an actionable policy problem 
(Hajer 2003). In fact, through CBK’s learning process of providing incremental oversight 
to M-Pesa as questions were raised by actors such as Kenya Bankers Association and the 
Ministry of Finance, and as M-Pesa’s functionality expanded, existing legislative frameworks 
were reviewed and new laws such as the Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism (AML/CFT) and the National Payment System (NPS) regulations were crafted. 
Meanwhile, Vodafone and Safaricom – with the complicity of the CBK in its ‘test and learn’ 
regulatory stance – exploited the policy void.
Despite the initial contention about who should regulate M-Pesa, CCK and CBK settled 
into a collaborative regulatory arrangement, with the latter taking the lead on decisions 
relating to the financial aspects of the platform, e.g. liquidity, deposit protection and fraud 
5renamed Communications authority of Kenya after the promulgation of the new constitution. see http://www.kachwanya.
com/2014/06/28/cck-ca-k/.
6the national Payment system (nPs) regulations were eventually approved by parliament in 2012. It codified many of the 
informal regulatory practices developed since M-Pesa launch (Muthiora 2015).
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prevention, while the former focused on regulating the underlying technical infrastructure. 
By exploiting the policy void, M-Pesa innovation disrupted the boundary between telecom-
munications and banking, and initiated new networks of actors across those institutional 
boundaries.
6.2. Legitimating the innovation in and around voids
Despite the socially beneficial nature of Vodafone and Safaricom’s innovative efforts, legiti-
macy for M-Pesa was not automatically conferred. The entrepreneurs engaged in efforts to 
persuade constituencies on the merits of M-Pesa and form practical connections to existing 
institutions in order to gain widespread social acceptance in the financial services sector. 
They deploy diverse strategies to address the needs of the different constituents that came 
into contact with M-Pesa in one way or the other, highlighted below.
6.2.1. Legitimacy building among market audience
From the outset, Vodafone and Safaricom’s efforts were geared towards addressing the 
substantive needs of the unbanked poor, which due to the market void were not catered 
for in the financial services sector. The entrepreneurs specifically adapted the solution to 
the capabilities and preferences of the unbanked by developing a solution using artefacts 
this audience was familiar with, based on rules that they recognised. In this regard, the 
development team adopted the basic GSM handset used by the poor as the foundational 
technology. Although challenging due to language structure and character limits, M-Pesa 
menus were translated into Swahili, the popular language in low-income urban areas and 
in rural villages. They also modelled M-Pesa’s peer-to-peer cash transfer system to address 
the social void resulting from the lack of mechanisms to make instant cash transfers across 
large distances, thus enabling urban migrants to provide frequent financial support to their 
families and dispersed informal groups to continue pooling funds regularly. Thus, as con-
cluded by the Central Bank of Kenya, ‘the system was designed with the Kenyan market 
in mind’ (AFI 2010, 5).
In addition, Safaricom as the implementing subsidiary used instruments of strategic 
public relations and impression management to actively influence perceptions of the market 
constituency and gain pragmatic legitimacy. Vodafone and Safaricom’s commercial team 
developed the ‘Send Money Home’ proposition marked by a significant investment in a 
nationwide marketing campaign through television, radio, print media, billboards, road 
shows and convoys travelling across the country to sign up new subscribers and demon-
strate the service.
A strong presence was established through the large network of M-Pesa agents, which 
were highly recognisable branded outlets featuring a prominent M-Pesa logo (Mas and 
Ng’weno 2010). M-Pesa adverts also featured a cultural, emotional and patriotic appeal. In 
addition to the compelling value proposition, Safaricom was a ‘powerful brand’ in Kenya 
(Mas and Ng’weno 2010, 357), well respected due to its home-grown products and CSR 
initiatives. Thus, M-Pesa’s legitimacy also rode on the dispositional spillovers reinforced by 
the trust and goodwill associated by the Safaricom brand.
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6.2.2. Legitimacy building among regulatory audience
Vodafone and Safaricom formed an alliance and proactively engaged with Central Bank of 
Kenya (CBK), in spite of the existence of a policy void. As the Head of Mobile Money at 
Consult Hyperion reported:
M-PESA’s approach to financial regulation, right from the start, was one of engagement. The 
very first, tentative moves towards M-PESA consisted of meetings with as many interested 
parties as possible – and, of course, the regulator was one of those, and his views diligently 
sought. But this was not a one-off process, and the team were very keen to ensure that the 
regulator was regularly kept abreast of developments. (Makin 2009, 6)
In fact, Vodafone and Safaricom leveraged the policy void to solidify the alliances with 
regulatory authorities in both banking (CBK) and telecommunications (CCK), both of 
whom were involved throughout the development, testing, launch and functional expansion 
of the M-Pesa platform. Both regulators were invited to brainstorming workshops prior 
to the development of the platform, and prototype demonstrations during development, 
all along addressing questions raised by CBK (AFI 2010; Hughes and Lonie 2007). Before 
launch, Safaricom submitted a request for authorisation to launch M-Pesa, and at the request 
of CBK, prepared a detailed risk mitigation programme and conducted an in-depth audit of 
the technological platform addressing anti-money laundering standards7 and operational 
risk factors such as hardware and software security, backup and audit trail capabilities (AFI 
2010).
From this review, CBK was satisfied that M-Pesa was adequately robust, and in February 
2007 issued a ‘Letter of No Objection’ authorising the launch of M-Pesa. The letter also 
specified reporting obligations and laid out a set of prudential and market rules, and 
allowed M-Pesa to operate under the oversight of CBK pending the approval of the NPS Act 
(Muthiora 2015). Expansions of product functionality were approved on a case-by-case basis 
as Safaricom and CBK coordinated further regulations. Such intense and continued engage-
ment with the regulator as the de facto gatekeeper of financial services industry ushered 
M-Pesa into a banking services, a privileged category of services that were strictly regulated 
and difficult to penetrate. The Letter of No Objection, which acted as a special licence that 
provided a form of certification, legitimated M-Pesa in the policy sphere. Safaricom used 
this certification as the basis for entrenching public confidence in the platform in the face 
of contestations by other actors in the industry.
Further, in order to legitimise the business model with the financial regulator, the M-Pesa 
team engaged in mimicry by deliberately taking steps to associate M-Pesa with financial 
services taken for granted in commercial banking, and prevent it from being perceived as 
‘dangerously avant garde’ as described by the Head of Mobile Money at Consult Hyperion:
In an attempt to ensure that M-Pesa was ‘covering all the bases’, [we took] steps which helped 
to ease the relationship with the regulatory authorities, by bringing a familiar structure to the 
relationship. All of this was not intended merely to convince the regulator to allow M-Pesa 
to launch – though, of course, it helped, and M-PESA was launched under a special licence 
– rather, it was done primarily because the team felt that, although M-Pesa is not a fully-regu-
lated financial institution, to behave like one is the only responsible approach. (Makin 2009, 6)
7the aML audit was based on Kenyan anti-Money Laundering draft legislation and the international guidelines by the 
Financial action task Force (FatF). Measures for Combating the Financing of terrorism (CFt) were also tested. these audits 
were conducted by Consult Hyperion, a technology consulting firm.
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Mimicking conventional banking services also prepared M-Pesa for future regulatory 
developments, and oriented the mind-set of staff towards a quasi-financial institution.
Due to sustained interactions with the regulator, Safaricom participated in setting the 
agenda for reforming existing regulations on electronic payment, and designing new guide-
lines for anti-money laundering and branchless banking, and in so doing engaged in pro-
active advocacy to institutionalise mobile money transfer as a legitimate financial service. 
Further, when objections about M-Pesa are raised by Kenya Bankers Association and the 
Ministry of Finance, we see Central Bank stepping in defence of mobile money innovation, 
indicating Safaricom’s co-optation of the regulator as a key constituent who then fought 
battles on its behalf, effectively securing the moral legitimacy of the innovation.
6.2.3. Legitimacy building among contesting audiences
Contestation about the nature and classification of the M-Pesa business opened up oppor-
tunities for Safaricom to engage in institutional work to change normative associations 
about financial service provision in Kenya. Firstly, as seen earlier, due to the policy void, 
the M-Pesa team and industry regulators grappled with the definition of mobile money in 
the context of regulated financial services during the development phase. Based on insights 
generated from Safaricom’s deliberations with a variety of actors, M-Pesa was defined as a 
non-bank money transfer service rather than a deposit taking service that would be subject 
to prudential regulations of the Banking Act.
As the M-Pesa subscription base grew rapidly among both the unbanked and the banked, 
commercial banks registered their discontent with CBK’s lax regulation of mobile money 
through their advocacy group – Kenya Bankers Association (KBA), citing the blurred lines 
between the deposit-taking for saving in banks and deposit-taking for payments in mobile 
network operators not subject to the prudential guidelines of the Banking Act. The Minister 
of Finance expressed similar reservations when he publicly ordered an audit of M-Pesa, 
stating: ‘I don’t know whether M-Pesa will end up well. [CBK] should study the scheme 
and pronounce policy to safeguard depositors’ (Daily Nation newspaper, Michuki: Probe 
cash transfer, 2 December 2008).
In response to these contestations, Safaricom attempted to reconfigure the institutional 
constraints that defined the scope of banking services in Kenya specifically by theorising on 
bank vs. non-bank services per regulation, and prognostic framing recasting mobile money as 
superior to banking in addressing the market void affecting the unbanked, and in addressing 
the social void that continued to deepen with further rural–urban migration. In their public 
responses, the former Safaricom CEO, and Vodafone’s Head of Global Payments, endeav-
oured to segregate mobile payment services vis-à-vis banking in the financial sector. In a 
reported press conference, the former Safaricom CEO presented the following argument:
Some of the banks are saying we are in competition, but I don’t think M-Pesa is a threat to 
banking industry. What we are doing is that we filling a gap that the banks have left out. We 
don’t classify this as a mobile banking product: this is a mobile payments service. (Daily Nation, 
Michuki: Probe cash transfer, 9 December 2008)
By projecting the ideal that financial inclusion will be achieved through M-Pesa which 
addresses the needs of the unbanked that commercial banks have neglected, Safaricom 
attained moral legitimacy in the eyes of the regulator, who then promoted this ideal to con-
testing parties. Through a legal opinion, Central Bank confirmed that M-Pesa is in fact not 
conducting the banking business. While declaring that ‘M-Pesa is an extremely important 
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tool for financial inclusion’ during the launch of a rival mobile money transfer platform 
in 2008, the CBK governor noted that with 11 million Kenyans having access to a mobile 
phone, and only approximately 4.5 million banked, mobile money as the new solution offers 
‘an avenue to push forward the access frontier in Kenya’, thus bringing more Kenyans into 
formal financial services.
This discourse drew new boundaries of meaning that defined the banking domain vis-à-vis 
the mobile money domain, thus allowing M-Pesa to thrive despite protestations, effectively 
changing normative associations previously linking financial services exclusively to banking. 
As a result, mobile money was accepted as a parallel, and even complementary institution 
without challenging banking as the pre-existing institution, but instead, leading other actors 
to challenge the efficacy of banking.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Multinational enterprises that engage in social innovation in BOP markets – whether to 
expand their operations in order to increase their bottom line, or to address social problems 
as part of their corporate social responsibility mandates – are confronted with the challenge 
of navigating new institutional contexts that constrain their behaviour. Entrepreneurial 
efforts in general involve instituting divergent change while gaining legitimacy (Aldrich and 
Marlene Fiol 1994), and such an undertaking is demanding when dealing with institutional 
complexities characteristic of BOP contexts. This paper focuses on how entrepreneurs iden-
tify and exploit different types of institutional voids through social innovation, and how they 
seek legitimacy for the innovation. The paper explores the case of M-Pesa, a mobile money 
innovation in the financial services industry in Kenya, and analyses the efforts of Vodafone 
UK and its subsidiary Safaricom Kenya Ltd as the institutional entrepreneurs that deployed 
the innovation. The findings explain how entrepreneurs discover and create entrepreneur-
ial opportunities for social innovation by simultaneously exploiting multiple institutional 
voids at the BOP. The analysis shows that gaining legitimacy for a social innovation involves 
efforts to establish how the innovation addresses or mitigates the institutional voids in that 
particular setting. Thus, spanning institutional voids is a key strategy to successfully deploy 
social innovations in institutionally complex environments.
As the first contribution, the study introduces a new interpretation of the institutional 
voids construct, and thus expands the scope in which this construct may be applied. Khanna 
and Palepu (2000) first advanced institutional voids as absences of or weaknesses in formal 
market institutions in BOP contexts. In the M-Pesa case, the market void associated with 
the large unbanked population exemplifies this type of void, and was discovered as an 
opportunity for social innovation to bridge the rift between ‘excluded’ social groups and 
the formal economy. Mair, Marti, and Ventresca (2012) advanced a second view that con-
ceptualised institutional voids as gaps or spaces that occur at interfaces between informal 
institutional spheres such as community, religion and politics. The social void in finan-
cial services in Kenya, which emerged from the fragmentation of previously tightly knit 
family and community groups due to rising rural–urban migration, illustrates this type 
of void. Upon discovery of this void, the M-Pesa entrepreneurs exploited it by designing 
a solution that facilitated instantaneous domestic remittances across large distances. This 
paper introduces a third type of institutional void found in formal institutional interfaces, 
i.e. between two formal institutional spheres. In the case, Vodafone and Safaricom created 
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an entrepreneurial opportunity in the sphere between telecommunications and banking 
where no regulatory guidelines existed, and in so doing yielded a policy void that enabled 
innovation. They exploited the policy void by designing a business model that integrated 
previously unrelated professional and policy orientations. This third type of void occurs not 
necessarily due to deficiencies in formal market institutions in these contexts as asserted 
in the literature, but rather due to the lack of generally accepted rules and norms outside 
established institutional arrangements. This finding analytically broadens the scope in which 
entrepreneurs exercise agency in BOP contexts.
Secondly, the study identifies legitimation strategies that may facilitate the successful 
deployment of a social innovation experiencing a high liability of newness. The findings 
show that in order to appeal to audiences consisting of fragmented, diverse constituents, 
a ‘contingency approach’ (Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidl 2013) in which firms simultaneously 
deploy different but targeted legitimation strategies is mobilised. With regard to the BOP 
market audience, the entrepreneurs in this study focus on appealing to their instrumental 
needs first by developing a substantively relevant product, by engaging in mimicry and 
investing in advertising and branding to gain pragmatic legitimacy. Legitimacy from policy 
audiences is conferred through early and sustained engagement, and this can be achieved 
by seeking certification early in the innovation process, undertaking voluntary audits and 
engaging in proactive advocacy. Further, by developing transparency in their interactions 
with policy-makers, entrepreneurs are able to co-opt policy actors to protect their interests 
in the face of contestation. Finally, legitimacy among contesting audiences is achieved by 
engaging in deliberate efforts to redefine meanings by changing normative associations, 
and theorising, framing and educating may shift prevailing institutions in favour of the 
new innovation.
Thirdly, the findings show that legitimacy building is part and parcel of the innovation 
process. The task of designing and implementing an innovation is in fact a process of cre-
ating new institutions – or proto-institutions (Tracey and Phillips 2011) – to fill existing 
voids. The design features and positioning of the technology or business model in relation 
to institutional voids determine the narrative that would be used to convince diverse audi-
ences to accept it. Further, spanning multiple voids provides contingent arguments that 
can be leveraged against each other to build a tighter business case. In the M-Pesa case, 
this is evident when the entrepreneurs reached moral legitimacy by pursuing meritorious 
outcomes of social inclusion to deal with the market void, and by pursuing explicit certifi-
cation, submitting to voluntary audits and co-opting regulators to deal with the policy void.
This paper has implications for MNCs engaging in social innovation in BOP contexts. 
Much of the BOP literature has focused disproportionately on the activities of multina-
tional enterprises in large emerging economies, especially India, Brazil, China and Russia. 
Moreover, there has been a tendency towards studying business models for entering these 
markets with a pure profit motive, rather than market-based poverty reduction (Bruton, 
Ahlstrom, and Li 2010; Khoury and Prasad 2016; Kolk, Rivera-Santos, and Rufín 2014; Mair 
and Marti 2009). Therefore, this paper, with its focus on firm strategies at the interface of 
profitability and poverty alleviation in an African context is a valuable contribution to the 
debate on market-based poverty alleviation.
The findings underscore the importance of multinationals immersing themselves into 
the BOP context to gain an intimate understanding of institutional factors, as opposed to 
developing solutions entirely based on Western market ideals (Mezias and Fakhreddin 
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2015; Prahalad and Hammond 2002). This entails tailoring their products to suit local 
requirements, aligning with the constraints and opportunities that local regulatory frame-
works present and adjusting their political strategies to appeal to the new audience while 
transferring ideas, skills and practices.
Expanding the scope for either discovering or creating institutional voids as opportunity 
spaces for entrepreneurship has implications not only for innovation for social inclusion 
as seen in this paper, but also for social innovation in industrialised contexts occurring at 
the boundaries of established institutions. It may be argued, however, that as policies in 
developing countries are relatively in flux and therefore less inert, the identification and 
exploitation of policy voids in such contexts may be easier. Future research could explore 
whether and how policy voids in industrialised contexts have been leveraged as opportu-
nities for social innovation, and how the attendant policy frameworks evolve. In addition, 
future research could include case studies of social innovation in transitional economies 
where institutional voids have also been found (see e.g. Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010; 
Santangelo and Meyer 2011), but rapid institutional shifts may enable or constrain multi-
nationals efforts to exploit those voids and gain legitimacy.
While institutional voids offer opportunities for entrepreneurship and legitimation, 
exploiting them may have a dark side. Actors may operate within institutional voids to 
carry out illegal activities with the knowledge that regulatory authorities lack the man-
date to implement sanctions. Entrepreneurs may also engage in activities deemed risky 
or unethical by other actors in the field. In the M-Pesa case for instance, Vodafone and 
Safaricom as mobile operators were seen as sidestepping prudential guidelines applied 
to commercial banks which, as argued by the Kenya Bankers Association, unlevelled the 
playing field and potentially exposed the financial system to various risks. These risks 
were ultimately addressed by developing new and extending existing regulations to cover 
mobile payments.
As a social innovation, the case of M-Pesa reinforces the assertion that solutions for 
pressing societal problems sometimes transgress the sovereignty of specific policies in place, 
and thus require interventions next to or across institutional orders (Hajer 2003). Addressing 
social problems at the BOP calls for ‘thinking outside of the box’ of formal Western-style 
institutional arrangements where they do not align with local norms, value systems and 
practices, or are difficult to implement due to severe resource constraints. Such innova-
tions, when successful, encourage actors to rethink the formal institutional framework in 
place, and explore ways of addressing institutional voids in a way that legitimises instead 
of invalidating idiosyncratic local norms.
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